Testing Worldviews: A Reader Question

In the comments to my last post, a reader named Darrell posted an interesting question. I answer on the thread, but thought it was worth repeating as a post for those who might miss it.

Q. "...in the book are you supporting the modern notion of a 'correspondence' theory of truth or are you noting something more similar to a post-modern take on such theories which is basically that such theories are only helpful to a point and can otherwise be somewhat unhelpful?"

A. Darrell, the section in question is about a page and a half long (pp. 33-34), and I don't really engage in a philosophical discussion. Rather, I approach the rival (and complementary) theories as tools. Instead of championing one over another, I take it for granted that we use all three -- trusting things that seem to correspond to external reality, trusting things that fit with what we already know, trusting things that solve problems other assumptions don't -- and we don't use any of them exclusively or absolutely. (And we use them cumulatively, too, not in an either/or fashion.) It might help if I quote the conclusion of the passage:

"These three tools are good as far as they go, but they are not necessarily conclusive. Sometimes a lie seems more coherent and consistent than the truth, so when we ask whether worldviews correspond to reality, whether they cohere and produce results, we have to admit that we're the ones asking -- i.e., subjective people and, according to Christian doctrine, fallen too. This is all part of the struggle that is worldview. We are constantly wrestling with ideas while we question our own ability to judge, always acting decisively only to look back with doubts after the fact." (p. 33)

Now I suspect there are people who would classify that as the "postmodern" approach, but to me it's more like common sense. The "modern/postmodern" dichotomy is really only useful as an entry-point -- or as a bit of polemic sleight-of-hand by which I can dismiss things by labeling them modernist to some audiences or postmodernist to others. In reality, the specifics of the argument are more important than the broad label.

I hope this helps -- and if it raises any additional questions, feel free to ask!

Comments

[Jacob]

Your answer calls to mind Scottish Realism to a greater or lesser extent: reality is pretty much as we perceive it to be. It formally states as matter of fact the way we actually operate: our senses are pretty reliable, our rational faculties pretty perceptive, etc. Am I tracking with you correctly?

[J. Mark Bertrand]

My reaction to the statement "reality is pretty much as we perceive it to be" is: who's we? I mean, I function as if my senses are reliable and my faculties perceptive, and I perceive a reality in which there is no such thing as chance. Others who seem to me more or less perceptive as an everyday matter see a very different world -- or perhaps I should say, draw very different conclusions from what they see.

As in so many matters, I'm not sure my own viewpoint rises to the level of an -ism. If I had to own a term, it would probably be critical realism, but I'm not sure how well I inhabit it.

[Darrell]

Mark, thank you for the clarification. I seem to detect a modern sensibility in your response, which perhaps answered my question more fully than you realize. For instance, when you note that you were not “really engaged in a philosophical discussion” but were analyzing these rival theories as “tools” I think we should point out that such a project is always already a philosophical discussion/endeavor. And to speak of “things that fit;” “things we already know;” and “things that solve problems;” one is left to ask: “Fits” with what? What do we already know—a self evident fact? And, what counts as “solving” a problem? It’s as if one were to say, “Yes, I get that modern/post-modern stuff, but, anyway, where was I, oh yes, as I was saying…” because clearly, what you are pointing out is just “common sense.” How modern, of course.

As David Hart put it, “At moments like this, one feels that something has been overlooked.” The only nod to the post-modern is when you note that it is we who are asking these questions thus we are not objective neutral observers only. I’m sure you have written a fine book. My thought though is that anyone writing about world-view today- must take into account the post-modern turn and the work of people like Jamie Smith, John Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy gang, MacIntyre, Hauerwas, and others—all of which have landed devastating blows against the modern construal of a “correspondence” theory of truth. Otherwise “worldview” speak simply becomes evangelicals demonstrating once again how they are more modern than orthodox.

[J. Mark Bertrand]

If Harold Bloom is right about misreading, Darrell, then you may be onto something. But let's assume for the moment that he's not. I make a distinction between what I'm attempting to do in the page and a half of Rethinking Worldview that references the subject and a full-fledged philosophical argument, not because I'm unaware of the sense in which we're all philosophers or theologians or what have you, and that any conversation about truth is inevitably philosophical, but because I think far too many dabblers without academic training in philosophy make high-sounding pronouncements without sufficient knowledge to do so. I don't want to be one of them, or at least, I want to make it clear when I am that I don't pretend otherwise. Does that mean I have a modern sensibility? If so, I wish more people did.

If you look at what I've said, though, I think it's almost classically postmodern -- at least by your own definition: "... such theories are only helpful to a point and can otherwise be somewhat unhelpful." That sounds very similar to what I wrote. The only difference is that I don't believe postmodernism owns the sensibility.

For the record, I've read David Hart, too, and Jamie Smith and the "Radical Orthodoxy gang," and what's more, I've read (with more or less comprehension) and been influenced (like most everyone else) by the people actually responsible for the postmodern turn. As I said, I didn't receive my training in philosophy; it was in creative writing, which included a heavy dose of literary criticism. This was before there had been any Christian domestication of postmodern thought, so my exposure was, if not unmediated, at least less mediated than the folks in the church today whose primary knowledge of the movement comes through Christian writers (though the ones you cite are excellent). If I'd ever argued for a "modern construal of a 'correspondence' theory of truth," I'd be very concerned about the "devastating blows" landed against it -- what's more, I probably wouldn't have referred to correspondence as just another way we sense truth, subject to limitations.

I'm as unimpressed by evangelicals "demonstrating once again how they are more modern than orthodox" as anyone. We might disagree on how such demonstrations are made, though. One thing I discovered in grad school was that, once I understood a literary theory -- say Marxism or Queer theory -- I could apply it to any text, whether I'd read it or not. In fact, I was usually bolder in class discussion when I was unhindered by having read the book. Based on that experience, I understand how tempting it is to "detect" sensibilities, to read between the lines of what an author has written -- even to dismiss it out of hand. All I can say in my defense is that, I've written Rethinking Worldview with these tensions in mind, and while I'd never compare it in terms of philosophical rigor to the work of professionals in that field, if you were to read the book you might form a different impression of my thought than you seem to have so far.

Regardless, I'm grateful for the input and hope you won't mind that I've bucked at the (to my mind, misplaced) criticism.